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Over ©s: Dilemmas in Establishing
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns
in US Courts for Intellectual Property
Infringement
ABSTRACT

When a foreign state infringes a US-held intellectual property
right abroad, it is unclear to what extent the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) bars suit in US courts. The FS1A's
already complex commercial activity exception, which governs such
actions, was further obfuscated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, which held that "substantiality"
and "foreseeability"could not be used to determine whether a foreign
sovereign's conduct had a "direct effect" in the United States, thus
warranting jurisdiction in a US court.
In the context of IP
infringement, where harms may be abstract and unquantifiable, this
restriction left courts with little guidance for determining whether the
FSIA permits jurisdiction over such claims. This Note analyzes the
contradictory reasoning of two courts in their application of the
Weltover "direct effect" test to IP infringement claims, noting that
where applied broadly the test permits an almost per se grant of
jurisdiction over a foreign state, but where construed narrowly, the
Weltover test seems to preclude suits against foreign sovereigns for IP
infringement altogether. This Note proposes a four-step test for
assessing intellectual property violations under the FSIA that seeks to
enforce the FSIA's strong presumption of immunity while also
accountingfor the unique harms that result from IP infringement.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODU CTION .................................................................... 599
FROM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY:
EVOLVING THEORIES OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN U S C OU RTS ..................................................................... 60 1

A. The Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity ................. 601
B. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity .............. 602
597

598
III.

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:3:597

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT:
PRESUMPTION OF AND EXCEPTIONS TO FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ......................................................... 603

A. Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity Under the FSIA:
Claims Based Upon Commercial Activity ......................
1. Interpreting the Direct Effect Provision of the
FSIA's Commercial Activity Exception ...............
a. The "Substantialand Foreseeable"Test:
A Pre-Weltover Interpretationof the
FSIA's Direct Effect Provision..................
b. Immediate Consequences: The Supreme
Court's "DirectEffect" Test Under
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover ...........
c. Post-Weltover Interpretationsof Direct
Effect: The "Legally SignificantAct" Test
IV.

604
606

606

608
609

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY EXCEPTION'S DIRECT EFFECT PROVISION IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES ........................................ 609

A. The Liberal Application of "DirectEffect" in

V.

CYBERsitter, LLC v. People's Republic of China .......... 610
B. Direct Effect Analysis in Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.,
v. Islam ic Republic of Iran ............................................. 610
ASSESSING THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
WELTOVER "IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES" TEST IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES ........................................ 612

A. The Weltover Immediate Consequences Test is
Ambiguous and Leads to Inconsistent Results ............... 613
B. The Immediate Consequences Test Fails to Balance
both the FSIA's Presumptionof Immunity and the
Commercial Activity Exception in Intellectual Property
Ca ses ............................................................................... 6 15
1. Finding an Immediate Consequence in an IP
Case Requires Courts to Neglect the FSIA's
Presumption of Im munity ................................... 615
2. Strict Adherence to the Immediate
Consequences Test Generally Precludes a
Finding of Direct Effect in IP Cases ................... 618
3. The Weltover Test is Inadequate for Addressing

the Uniqueness of Intellectual Property
Infringem ent Claim s ........................................... 618
VI.

SOLUTION: REINTERPRETING THE FSIA'S DIRECT EFFECT
REQUIREMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE NATURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ...................................... 621

2016]

VII.

OVER ©S

599

A. The Effect Alleged Must Be More than a Bare Claim of
Infringement, But May Include Claims of Reputational
Harm and FinancialLoss ............................................... 621
B. The Effect Must Be Felt in the United States................. 623
C. The Effect Felt Must Be Actual and Direct .................... 624
D. The Effect Must Be Substantial..................................... 625
C ONCLU SION ....................................................................... 626

I. INTRODUCTION

The Chinese government steals a US company's software
program and makes it available for download on the Internet. The
Iranian government copies the design of a US helicopter and
manufactures a look-alike that lacks the original model's safety
features. The same acts, if committed by individuals or private
entities, would likely form the basis of clear-cut IP infringement
claims under US domestic law. However, the principle of foreign
sovereign immunity, codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA or "Act") of 1976, has complicated the adjudication of IP claims
in US courts when the infringing party is a foreign state. The FSIA,
which governs all claims against foreign states in US courts, rests on a
simple premise: it creates a presumption of immunity for foreign
sovereigns from suit in US courts.1 Yet the statute does not guarantee
immunity unconditionally, and its presumption of immunity is
rebuttable in the form of several enumerated exceptions. 2 Inherent in
the Act's structure, then, is a tension between its sweeping conferment
of immunity on the one hand, and its strategic curtailment of that
grant on the other.
The FSIA's most important restraint on the presumption of
3
foreign sovereign immunity is the commercial activity exception.
This exception prevents a foreign state from seeking immunity in US
courts when it behaves in the manner of a private actor in the
marketplace, such as a buyer or seller of goods, rather than in a
sovereign capacity. 4 The limit the commercial activity exception

1.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). For example, in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) shielded
Argentina from prosecution in US courts for the destruction of an oil tanker during wartime
because the Act's presumption of sovereign immunity was not overcome.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012); see, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390,
392 (2015).
3.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992); see infra Part
III.A.
4.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611.
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places on the FSIA's presumption of immunity has been significantly
diminished, however, since the 1992 case Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover. In that case, the Supreme Court announced its ambiguous
"immediate consequences" test for determining what it means for a
foreign state's commercial activity abroad to have a "direct effect" in
the United States, thus rendering the foreign sovereign subject to
jurisdiction in a US court. 5 In general terms, the immediate
consequences test requires a foreign state's actions abroad to have a
direct effect or "immediate consequence" in the United States,
uninfluenced by intervening acts, in order for the foreign state to be
subject to suit under the FSIA. The test has proved to be vague and
inadequate-as is particularly evident in intellectual property cases,
where the Weltover test is either too restrictive or too permissive, but
never just right. When applied narrowly, the Weltover test has
permitted foreign governments to profit from the violation of an
intellectual property right by making it seemingly impossible for US
IP-rights holders to obtain jurisdiction over an infringing sovereign.
Conversely, at least one court has construed the test as providing an
almost per se grant of jurisdiction over a foreign state in IP cases-a
reading made possible by Weltover's elimination of the safeguards
courts had previously used to maintain the FSIA's strong presumption
of sovereign immunity.
This Note details the confused state of the law regarding the
"direct effect" provision of the FSIA's commercial activity exception as
it applies to intellectual property cases. Part II gives an overview of
the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States,
noting its origins in the absolute theory of immunity and its transition
to the more plaintiff-friendly restrictive approach. Part III introduces
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-a codification of the
restrictive theory of immunity-and focuses on the Act's important,
but ambiguous, commercial activity exception and its "direct effect"
requirement. This Section discusses various interpretations of the
"direct effect" provision, both before and after the Supreme Court
addressed the issue in Weltover. Part IV highlights the muddled state
of the law regarding the application of the direct effect provision to
intellectual property, focusing on the conflicting holdings of two
post-Weltover IP cases. Part V delves further into the reasoning
employed by both cases, noting how each case furthers or defeats the
purposes of the FSIA, the commercial activity exception, and domestic
US intellectual property law. Part VI proposes a revised four-step test
for dealing with intellectual property violations under the FSIA that

5.

See id. at 618.
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will help reinvigorate the underlying purpose of the commercial
activity exception by taking into account the unique harms relevant to
IP infringement cases.

II. FROM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY: EVOLVING
THEORIES OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN US COURTS

Intellectual property claims against foreign sovereigns, and
tests used to administer them, are best understood in the context of

the particular theory of sovereign immunity that Congress intended to
codify in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. This, in turn, calls
for an understanding of the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in
the United States from an absolute to a rebuttable presumption.
A. The Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity

Exceptions to the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, such
as the FSIA's commercial activity exception, are a relatively recent
feature of US law. 6 Historically, US courts operated under the theory
of absolute immunity, which grants a foreign sovereign unqualified
freedom from suit in the courts of other foreign states. 7 First adopted
by the Supreme Court in the 1812 case The Schooner Exchange v.

McFaddon,8 this principle of blanket immunity was designed to
facilitate economic and political partnerships between nations by
ensuring that government officials would be protected when engaging
in business abroad. The theory of absolute immunity likely has its
roots in the long-standing maxim par in parem non habet imperium,

which holds that "no State can claim jurisdiction over another."9 As
Justice Marshall articulated in The Schooner Exchange, comity impels
nations to treat each other as both equal and independent sovereigns,
and to waive territorial jurisdiction over the acts of all other states.' 0
6.
The FSIA, which codified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, was enacted in
1976. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892.
7.
See, e.g., Heidi L. Frostestad, Note: Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China: Can a
Uniform Interpretation of a "Direct Effect" Be Attained Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) of 1976?, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 515, 521-22 (2000) (noting that throughout the
nineteenth century, American courts applied the theory of absolute immunity, which stipulates
that "a state enjoys complete immunity from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of other states").
8.
11 U.S. 116, 138-39 (1812); see also Frostestad, supra note 7.
9.
See Jeffrey N. Martin, Sovereign Immunity: Limits of Judicial Control: The
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 429, 431 n.11 (1977).
10.
See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 137 ('This perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse . ..
have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave the exercise of
a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute
of every nation.").
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B. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
After reigning for more than a century as the predominant
theory of sovereign immunity in the United States, the strict theory of
absolute immunity gradually fell out of favor in US courts.11 As the
United States increasingly engaged in commercial activity with
foreign governments, the availability of legal recourse in that arena
became more desirable. 12 Shortly after World War II, the absolute
theory of immunity gave way to the more progressive theory of
restrictive immunity, officially adopted by the US State Department
in its 1952 Tate Letter. 13 Under the restrictive theory of immunity, a
foreign sovereign is not immune from suit in the courts of another
state when it acts as a private actor, rather than in a sovereign
capacity. 14 The rationale for the theory is that "[w]hen a foreign state
enters the marketplace or when it acts as a private party, there is no
justification in modern international law for allowing the foreign state
to avoid the economic costs of the agreements it may breach or the
accidents it may cause."'15 Thus, with the rise of globalization and
enhanced commercial activity between nations, the age-old principle of
unqualified sovereign immunity was eroded by a new theory-one that
diminished a foreign sovereign's right to benefit from immunity in US
courts when acting in the private sphere.
The transition from the absolute to the restrictive theory of
immunity was not necessarily a smooth one.
In addition to
announcing the State Department's official adoption of the theory of
restrictive immunity, the Tate Letter also declared that the State
Department itself, rather than the judiciary, would decide all matters

11.
See Frostestad, supra note 7, at 522-23.
12.
See id.
13.
See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Sec'y of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen., 26 Dep't of State Bull. 969, 984-85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]
(announcing the US government's adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity).
14.
See, e.g., Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,94th Cong. 25, 30 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief,
Foreign Litig. Section, Civil Div., Dep't of Justice) ("Under [the restrictive] theory, immunity is
granted only with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's governmental
acts-called activities jure imperii-andnot with respect to those arising out of its commercial or
proprietary acts, or other acts which are governed by private law, so-called activities jure
gestionis"); Tate Letter, supra note 13, at 985 (noting that "the [State] Department feels that the
widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts").
15.
Hearings,supra note 14, at 27.
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relating to sovereign immunity. 16 The authoritative role of the
executive branch in determining when to grant immunity to a foreign
state proved to be problematic, however.1 7 Instead of faithfully
adhering to the restrictive theory of immunity, the State Department

often based its decisions on political, as opposed to judicial,
considerations. 18 Eventually, the inconsistency and bias in the State
Department's application of sovereign immunity led to the passage of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976.19

III. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: PRESUMPTION OF AND
EXCEPTIONS TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The FSIA, which provides the sole means of establishing
jurisdiction over claims against a foreign sovereign in the United
States, 20 is a legislative codification of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. 21 Under the Act, foreign sovereigns and their
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities are afforded
presumptive immunity from suit in US courts unless one of a few
exceptions to immunity applies. 22 The burden of overcoming the Act's
presumption of immunity initially falls on the plaintiff, who must
produce evidence that the foreign sovereign's actions fall within one of
several exceptions detailed in Sections 1605 to 1607.23 If successful,

16.
Tate Letter, supra note 13 at 984-85 (asserting that the State Department itself
would consider requests for sovereign immunity made by foreign governments, acknowledging
is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts
that even though "[i]t
... it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the
executive has declined to do so").
See, e.g., Frostestad, supra note 7, at 523-24.
17.
See. e.g., David E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining "A
18.
Direct Effect in the United States" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 261, 266 n. 31, 33 (1995) (noting that prior to the
enactment of the FSIA, courts automatically granted immunity to foreign states when requested
by the State Department "without making separate determinations of law or fact," and that "in
certain cases the commercial interests of a private litigant [yielded] to a political decision that
immunity in a particular case, although unfair to the private person who dealt with a foreign
government entity as a commercial actor, was necessary in the interest of... foreign relations").
See, e.g., id.
19.
20.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(c) (2012) ("[Ain appearance by a foreign state does not confer
personal jurisdiction with respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any transaction or
occurrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of this title."); Argentine Repub. v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989); Exp. Grp. v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.
1995); CYBERsitter, LLC v. People's Republic of China, 805 F. Supp 2d. 958, 975 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
21.
See, e.g., Frostestad, supranote 7, at 524.
22.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2012).
See Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1183
23.
(D.C.Cir. 2013) (citing FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 447 F.3d 835,
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the sovereign then bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that
24
the exception does not apply and immunity should be upheld.
A. Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity Under the FSIA: Claims Based
Upon CommercialActivity
As a codification of the restrictive theory of immunity, the
FSIA contains a number of exceptions to its general presumption of
immunity-the most important of which is the commercial activity
exception, enumerated in Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act. 25 This
exception stipulates that US courts shall have jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims against a foreign sovereign that are based upon the
sovereign's commercial activity, provided that the activity is
sufficiently linked to the United States. 26 Section 1605(a)(2) details
three such links to the United States:27 (1) commercial activity
"carried on" in the United States, (2) commercial activity "carried on"
outside the United States but "in connection with"28 an act performed
in the United States, and (3) an act both performed outside the United
States and in connection with a commercial activity outside the
United States, so long as the act causes a "direct effect" in the United
29
States.
The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as either "a regular
course of commercial conduct" or "a particular commercial transaction
or act. ' 30 Thus, even a single commercial act may qualify for analysis

842 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 87
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
24.
See Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d at 1183 (citing FG Hemisphere,447 F.3d at 842).
25.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611.
26.
See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (2012).
27.
Id.
28.
In determining what it means for an act to be performed "in connection with" a
commercial activity, a court must make two inquiries. See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
107 F.3d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1997). First, the court must decide whether the foreign state engaged
in a commercial activity. See, e.g. id. Second, the court must examine whether the acts at issue
were performed in connection with that commercial activity. See id. In order to satisfy this
requirement, there must be a "causal link" or "substantive connection" between the foreign
state's act and the commercial activity. Id. at 726 (quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin &
Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1289-91 (3rd Cir. 1993)).
29.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a) ("A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.").
30.
28 U.S.C. §1603(d).
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under the commercial activity exception. 3 1 The Act also specifies that
in determining whether an activity is commercial in character, courts
32
should analyze the nature of the activity, rather than its purpose.
The distinction between the nature and the purpose of an activity may
be difficult to parse. 33 In Weltover, the Supreme Court distinguished
the two by reasoning that the purpose of an activity refers to "the
reason why the foreign state engages in the activity," while the nature
of an activity, the relevant inquiry, refers to "the outward form of the
conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to perform. 3 4 In
other words, the commercial activity inquiry concerns behavior, rather
than motivation. 35 Thus, the question is not whether the foreign
sovereign is motivated by profit or by "uniquely sovereign
objectives. ' 36 Rather, the relevant analysis is whether the actions of
the foreign state, regardless of their motivation, are of the kind
performed by a private entity participating in "trade and traffic or
37
commerce."
In order to gain immunity under the FSIA, the acts performed
38
by a foreign state must be sovereign rather than private in nature,
because under the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity,
only state sovereign acts are entitled to immunity. 39 By contrast, acts
of a foreign state that are comparable to those of a private person or
corporation engaging in marketplace activity are not afforded
immunity in US state or federal courts. 40 Thus, the commercial
activity exception analyzes the nature of the acts performed by a
foreign sovereign, as opposed to their purpose: "an [activity] is
commercial unless it is one that only a sovereign state could
perform. 4 1 This is true even if the sovereign performed the act in
42
light of a governmental purpose.
By way of illustration, the Supreme Court in Weltover reasoned
that the regulation of a State's foreign currency exchange is a

31.
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 612.
28 U.S.C. §1603(d) ('The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
32.
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose.").
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617.
33.
See id.
34.
See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993).
35.
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.
36.
See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990)).
37.
See id.
38.
See id. at 613.
39.
See id. at 614.
40.
Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002).
41.
See id.
42.
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distinctly sovereign activity, as only a foreign sovereign has the power
to exercise such control over commerce. 43 Alternatively, a contract to
buy military supplies, such as combat boots and bullets, is a
commercial activity because contracting for the sale of goods is a type
44
of activity that a private company could engage in.
While it can be difficult to parse the difference between
commercial and sovereign acts under the commercial activity
exception, the real source of debate concerns the meaning of "direct
effect" within the third prong of the exception.
1. Interpreting the Direct Effect Provision of the FSIA's Commercial
Activity Exception
The third clause of the FSIA's commercial activity exception,
which governs the claims against foreign sovereigns that are most
geographically attenuated from the United States, 45 can be broken
into three interconnected parts. 46 The first part of the clause specifies
that the plaintiffs cause of action must be based upon an act that
transpired outside the United States. Second, that act must have
occurred in connection with a commercial activity performed by the
foreign state outside the United States. Finally, the foreign state's act
must have caused a "direct effect" in the United States.4 7 Importantly,
then, a foreign state that engages in a commercial activity may
nevertheless remain immune from suit in US courts under the FSIA if
its acts did not give rise to a direct effect that occurred in the United
States. 48 Courts' interpretations of this final "direct effect" provision
have varied significantly, both before and after the Supreme Court
weighed in on the issue in Weltover.
a. The "Substantialand Foreseeable" Test: A Pre-Weltover
Interpretationof the FSIA's Direct Effect Provision
In Weltover, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the
definition of "direct effect" under the FSIA's commercial activity
exception and rejected the approach of the many lower courts that had

43.

See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.

44.

See id.

45.
See generally 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) (permitting jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim
against a foreign sovereign that is based upon "an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States").
See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1997).
46.
47.
See id.
48.
See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1987).
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required "substantiality" or "foreseeability. ' 49 Prior to Weltover, many
courts followed the guidance of the House Report accompanying the
FSIA, which states that the third clause of the FSIA's commercial
activity section should be read in conjunction with the principles
detailed in Section 18 of the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. 50 The Restatement, in turn, stipulates that
US laws should not be applied extraterritorially, except in regard to
acts that have a "substantial effect" in the United States that is a

"direct and foreseeable result" of the conduct. 51

This framework

availment
and purposeful
minimum
contacts
parallels
the
requirements of a personal jurisdiction analysis. Indeed, a New York

district court, citing the Act's House Report, reasoned that the true
purpose of the "direct effect" provision was to incorporate principles of
personal jurisdiction:
The "direct effect" requirement... is apparently intended, in part, to ensure that there
is "some connection between the law suit and the United States" thereby assuring that
the exercise of the court's personal jurisdiction over the foreign state under section
1330(b) comports with the minimum contacts set forth in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington and McGee v. InternationalLife InsuranceCo. Therefore, the "direct effect"
exception... requires not only that there be an immediate causal effect within the
United States, but also that there be sufficient minimum contacts between the matter in
controversy 52and the United States to support the court's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction.

The Weltover Court rejected the "substantial and foreseeable"

test derived from the Second Restatement, however, noting that
Section 18 of the Second Restatement dealt with jurisdiction to
legislate rather than jurisdiction to adjudicate, rendering it
inapplicable to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 53 Therefore,
49.
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
50.
See id. at 617-18; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6618 (addressing the meaning of "direct effect" under the FSIA: "The third situation- an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States'-would embrace commercial conduct
abroad having direct effects within the United States which would subject such conduct to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States consistent with principles set forth in section 18,
Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965)"); see also
Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Grp., Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1989).
51.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (Am.
Law Inst. 1965) ("A state has jurisdiction to prescribea rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if ...(i) the
conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect
within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.") (emphasis added).
Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 903-04
52.
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted).
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617-18 (reiterating that the House Report's reliance on
53.
Section 18 of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States
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while acknowledging that the principle of de minimis non curat lex
prohibits the finding of jurisdiction based on "purely trivial effects" in
the United States, the Court disagreed with the suggestion that
an implicit requirement of
forth
sets
1605(a)(2)
Section
"substantiality" or "foreseeability. 54
b. Immediate Consequences: The Supreme Court's "DirectEffect" Test
Under Republic of Argentina v. Weltover
Rather than implementing the "substantial and foreseeable"
test of direct effect employed by the majority of lower courts at the
time, the Supreme Court in Weltover adopted the reasoning of the
Second Circuit, stating that an effect is direct if it "follows as an
immediate consequence of the defendant's ... activity. ''55 This simply
means that in order for an effect to be direct under the commercial
56
activity exception, it may not be interrupted by an intervening act.
Additionally, a direct effect under Weltover requires an act abroad to
have some additional consequence that reaches the United States
beyond a bare claim of breach of contract or tort. So, for example, the
Weltover Court held that Argentina's failure to repay investors' bonds
had a direct effect in the United States because that failure to pay, in
addition to constituting a breach of contract, also meant that money
57
promised to be delivered to the United States was not forthcoming.
Highlighting the direct effect prong's attenuated nexus to the United
States, the Weltover holding indicates that it is possible for the "direct
of
effect" requirement to be satisfied even if the parties consist entirely
58
foreign entities with no other connections to the United States.

was "a bit of a non sequitur"); see also Tex. Trading Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 1981).
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618. The FSIA automatically confers personal jurisdiction
54.
over a foreign state when there is subject matter jurisdiction and adequate service, without
requiring an analysis of minimum contacts or purposeful availment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b)
(2012) ("[P]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over
which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made
under section 1608 of this title.").
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 (citing Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d
55.
145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.
2004) (acknowledging the Supreme Court's definition of direct effects in Weltover).
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
56.
(explaining that a direct effect "has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line
without deviation or interruption") (citations omitted).
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
57.
See id.; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
58.
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c. Post-Weltover Interpretationsof Direct Effect: The "Legally
Significant Act" Test
The Supreme Court's immediate consequences test for
determining what constitutes a direct effect under the FSIA's
commercial activity exception rejected the statute's legislative history,
overturned the vast majority of case law that preceded it, and has
proven controversial and difficult to apply. 59 Rather than providing a
more detailed standard or a list of factors to help determine the
meaning of "direct effect," the Court in Weltover merely clarified that
"direct" means immediate and that "effect" refers to a consequence. In
an attempt to clarify the still ambiguous test, some courts of appeal
have specified that a "legally significant act" must have occurred in
the United States in order to fulfill the direct effect requirement after
Weltover. 60 This approach has been adopted by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits. 61 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, however, rejected this test,
reasoning that the Supreme Court in Weltover specifically declined to
read any implicit requirements into the statute. 62 In addition to a
split of authority regarding the legally significant act test, courts have
also differed in their approaches to more specific issues arising under
the direct effect test. This is particularly notable in the area of
intellectual property, where courts have varied drastically in their
application of the Weltover immediate consequences test.
IV. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
EXCEPTION'S DIRECT EFFECT PROVISION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASES

Courts have struggled to adopt a uniform approach in
examining direct effect under the FSIA post-Weltover. The vagueness
of the Weltover immediate consequences test is particularly evident
and problematic in cases involving intellectual property infringement
by a foreign sovereign. 63 Two recent cases, CYBERsitter, LLC v.
People's Republic of China6 4 and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., v.
Islamic Republic of Iran,6 5 demonstrate the dilemma in balancing IP
concerns with the FSIA.
59.
60.
(describing
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Frostestad, supra note 7, 528-29 (2000).
See, e.g., Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 817-18 (6th Cir. 2002)
division of authority).
Id. at 817.
Id. at 817-18.
See, e.g., CYBERsitter, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
Id.
734 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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A. The Liberal Application of "DirectEffect" in CYBERsitter, LLC v.
People's Republic of China
At one end of the spectrum in intellectual property cases that
engage in a "direct effect" analysis under the FSIA's commercial
activity exception is the Central District of California's decision in
CYBERsitter, LLC v. People's Republic of China.66 This case leniently
held that the commercial activity's direct effect requirement was
satisfied when "the locus of [the] injury occurred at Plaintiffs
principal place of business" in California. 67 Like other courts in the
Ninth Circuit, the CYBERsitter court adopted the "legally significant
act" test in determining direct effect. 68 While the CYBERsitter opinion
does not offer much analysis regarding the court's finding of a direct
effect, the court acknowledged that mere financial loss in the United
States is not sufficient by itself to satisfy the commercial activity
exception. 69 What was sufficient, the court reasoned, was that the
plaintiff copyright-owner's principal place of business was in
California, and that therefore the Chinese government's intentional
misappropriation of the plaintiffs copyrighted software (by licensing,
sublicensing, and distributing the software code) had a direct effect in
the United States. 70 Courts citing CYBERsitter have interpreted its
holding as supporting the sweeping proposition that an IP
infringement by a foreign sovereign has a per se direct effect in the
United States when the owner of the intellectual property right is a
71
US citizen, resident, or company.
B. Direct Effect Analysis in Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., v. Islamic
Republic of Iran
On the other end of the spectrum, a more conservative
interpretation of direct effect in IP cases is found in Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc., v. Islamic Republic of Iran.72 In Bell Helicopter, an
American helicopter manufacturer brought a claim against the Islamic
Republic of Iran under the commercial activity exception, alleging that
Iran manufactured and marketed a similar helicopter in violation of

66.
805 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
67.
Id. (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 n.2 (9th Cir.
1998)).
68.
See id. at 976-77.
69.
Id.
70.
See id.
71.
See Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 892 F. Supp. 2d 219
(D.D.C. 2012).
72.
734 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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the Lanham Act, which prohibits trademark dilution and
infringement. 73 Noting that no circuit court had addressed whether
an IP infringement occurring abroad could cause a direct effect in the
United States, the D.C. Circuit refuted the plaintiff-manufacturer's
claim that the effect of infringement "occurs where the possessor of
74
the intellectual property lives," as held by the CYBERsitter court.
The Bell Helicopter court instead required a more exacting analysis of
direct effect, reasoning that the effect must not be "purely trivial" and
that damage to the intellectual property owner's reputation, assuming
it is an effect at all, is "too remote and attenuated" to satisfy Weltover's
75
"immediate consequences" test.
The Bell Helicopter court first found that there was no
violation under the Lanham Act because "the buying public [was not]
likely to believe that defendant's services [came] from the same
source, or [were] affiliated with the trademark owner," as the Act
required.7 6 Secondly, the court concluded that even if there were a
sufficient IP infringement to constitute an "effect," the effect could not
be characterized as direct, because a plaintiffs status as a US citizen
or corporation cannot be the only connection between the commercial
77
activity and the United States.
Before the case reached the D.C. Circuit on appeal, the lower
Bell Helicopter court elaborated on how its analysis differed from
CYBERsitter. At the district court level, the plaintiff-manufacturer in
Bell Helicopter relied on CYBERsitter to support its claim that "the
location of the harm is the location of the harmed company" in an
intellectual property case under the FSIA. 78 The D.C. District Court
79
in Bell Helicopter, however, noted that CYBERsitter cited Panavision
to support its proposition, but that Panavision was a personal
jurisdiction case and was therefore not relevant to the direct effect
CYBERsitter, the court reasoned, was an overinquiry.8 0
simplification of the personal jurisdiction and waiver of sovereign
immunity analyses required under the FSIA. 81 Additionally, the Bell

73.
See id. at 1178.
74.
See id. at 1182.
See id. at 1183-84 (citing Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618) (internal quotation marks
75.
omitted).
76.
See id. at 1185 (citing Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 639 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
77.
See id. (citing Cruise Connections Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Att'y Gen. of Can., 600
F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
See Bell Helicopter,892 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
78.
79.
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
80.
See Bell Helicopter,892 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
81.
Id.
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Helicopter court stated that conduct requiring "the participation of a
series of actors and events before the harm can be felt" cannot be
deemed to have a direct effect and that the CYBERsitter case was thus
at odds with precedent.8 2 Finally, the D.C. district court distinguished
the facts of the cases, explaining that no marketing occurred in the
United States in Bell Helicopter, while in CYBERsitter, the infringing
83
foreign state made the software at issue available to a US audience.
At the appellate level, while the D.C. Circuit did not
distinguish CYBERsitter, it supported its own contrary reasoning with
a policy rationale-namely, that "[i]f a loss to an American individual
and firm resulting from a foreign tort were sufficient standing alone to
satisfy the direct effect requirement, the commercial activity exception
would in large part eviscerate the FSIA's provision of immunity for
foreign states. '8 4 In this sense, the Bell Helicopter court's more
restrictive interpretation of "direct effect" under the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA conveys an underlying policy of
protecting the FSIA's presumption of immunity for foreign sovereigns
in US courts.
V. ASSESSING THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WELTOVER
"IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES" TEST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES

While only a limited number of intellectual property cases have
been analyzed under the direct effect provision of the FSIA, these
cases highlight three major defects in the Weltover immediate
consequences test. First, the inconsistent holdings of these IP cases
85
expose the ambiguity of the test and, in turn, its unpredictability.
Second, these cases demonstrate that, in the realm of intellectual
property, the immediate consequences test fails to adequately balance
the Act's underlying presumption of immunity with its exceptions to
immunity-namely, the commercial activity exception. Finally, these
cases show that the Weltover test for direct effect overlooks the unique
nature of IP rights, and therefore risks precluding an entire class of
claims from litigation in the United States under the FSIA. The
Weltover Court's interpretation of the FSIA's direct effect provision is

Id.
82.
Id.
83.
See Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d at 1184.
84.
Compare CYBERsitter, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (holding that IP infringement by a
85.
foreign sovereign had a direct effect in the United States because plaintiff copyright owner's
principal place of business was in California), with Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d at 1183 (rejecting
plaintiff IP-right holder's claim that infringement results in a direct effect where the IP-right
owner lives).
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thus inadequate, and its failures are particularly evident in the area
of intellectual property.
A. The Weltover Immediate Consequences Test is Ambiguous and
Leads to Inconsistent Results.
The immediate consequences test adopted by a unanimous
Court in Weltover is a vague standard that obscured, rather than
clarified, the meaning of "direct effect" under the FSIA's commercial
Courts, politicians, and academics alike have
activity exception.
exposed the ambiguity of the Weltover test.8 6 Two years after the
Weltover decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that the test lacks any
objective standard for courts to utilize in determining what constitutes
a direct effect.8 7 The court implied that the Weltover test is not a
functional standard, but rather a comparison test, explaining that in
attempting to implement the test, courts "are left to determine what
qualifies as a direct effect largely from the Supreme Court's example
in applying the [FSIA] to the facts before it in Weltover. 8 8s Thus, the
Weltover direct effect test is essentially only useful to the extent that
89
courts can analogize to it or distinguish it based on its facts.
Because the Weltover Court confronted a breach of contract claim,
limiting the case to its facts impairs direct effect analyses in other
areas of the law, such as intellectual property. 90
Not only did the Weltover Court fail to detail any tangible
factors for courts to consider in analyzing direct effect, but in adopting
the immediate consequences test set forth by the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the two definitive requirements that
a majority of courts had previously relied on-foreseeability and
substantiality. 91 By declining to incorporate the substantiality and
foreseeability standard into its immediate consequences test, the
Supreme Court eliminated important barriers to jurisdiction in US
courts for acts committed by foreign sovereigns or their agencies and
instrumentalities abroad. Most significantly, when it abolished the
substantiality requirement, the Supreme Court made it possible for a
court to find that even a minor effect could satisfy the "immediate
consequences" direct effect test. 92 Indeed, in the post-Weltover case of
86.
87.
Cir. 1994).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Gohlke, supra note 18 at 289-90.
United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th
See Gohlke, supra note 18 at 289-90.
See id.
See infra Part V.B.3.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
See Gohlke, supra note 18 at 283-84, 286.
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Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, a Florida district court
found that, in a direct effect analysis, Weltover "teaches that the effect
in the United States need only be slight. Although the effect cannot
be speculative, the contact with the United States may indeed be only
a tangential one to support jurisdiction under the FSIA." 93 The
Supreme Court in Weltover attempted to caution against such a "slight
and tangential" test by reminding courts of the principle of de
minimus non curat lex, which prohibits courts from adjudicating
Nevertheless, by establishing a vague
purely trivial matters. 94
standard for direct effect, the Supreme Court left lower courts to
grapple with the ambiguities in the new immediate consequences
test.95 Predictably, this led to results that the Weltover Court would
likely disfavor, as well as general inconsistency in the test's
96
application.
The unpredictability of the Weltover test is particularly
prevalent in the realm of intellectual property, where inconsistent
holdings mean that neither plaintiffs nor foreign states have the
ability to foresee what result a court may reach when confronted with
an infringement dispute. The divergent reasoning of the CYBERsitter
and Bell Helicopter cases demonstrates the test's irregular application.
In CYBERsitter, the court seemed to treat intellectual property
infringement as a per se direct effect under the FSIA's commercial
activity exception whenever the holder of the intellectual property
right resides in the United States. 97 Bell Helicopter, however,
indicated that only a clear-cut case analogous to the breach of contract
claim in Weltover could sufficiently constitute a direct effect. 98 As it
has been applied to intellectual property, then, the immediate
consequences test is either too permissive or too restrictive for
determining which infringement claims may be heard in US courts.
Because the immediate consequences test is difficult to administer, it
invites extremes and leads to inconsistent application and
unpredictability for litigants, as demonstrated by the widely different

See id. at 286 (citing Ampac Grp. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 977
93.
(S.D. Fla. 1992)).
94.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
95.
See Gohlke, supra note 18 at 284.
96.
See, e.g., CYBERsitter,, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
97.
See id. (holding that China's misappropriation of copyrighted software established a
direct effect in the United States because "the locus of that injury occurred at Plaintiffs principal
place of business in California").
98.
See Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d. at 1186 (noting that plaintiff Bell's evidence of a direct
effect in the United States is either "too remote and attenuated" or "too speculative" to satisfy
the Weltover standard).
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results of the two intellectual property cases to be analyzed under the
direct effect test post- Weltover.
B. The Immediate Consequences Test Fails to Balance both the FSIA's
Presumptionof Immunity and the Commercial Activity Exception in
Intellectual Property Cases
Because it is either too permissive or too restrictive as applied
to intellectual property claims, the Weltover immediate consequences
test is incapable of properly balancing the dual aims of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. The FSIA is founded on two conflicting
principles.9 9 At its core, the Act is designed to uphold the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity and does so by affording foreign states
presumptive immunity from suit in US courts. 100 Still, Congress
enacted the FSIA in order to codify the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity, suggesting that the Act's exceptions to immunity
are some of its most important provisions. 0 1
The immediate
consequences test of direct effect, which is vague and underdeveloped,
cannot account for both of these principles in intellectual property
cases where more nuance is required to deal with the intangibility of
IP rights. The CYBERsitter and Bell Helicopter cases demonstrate
that, in IP cases, upholding one of the FSIA's dual aims necessarily
means that the other fails to be accounted for.
1. Finding an Immediate Consequence in an IP Case Requires Courts
to Neglect the FSIA's Presumption of Immunity
In CYBERsitter, the court failed to balance the FSIA's
exceptions to immunity against its crucial underlying presumption of
immunity-prioritizing the former over the latter. 102
The court
reached a favorable finding for the plaintiff-IP holder, but did so by
either (1) misunderstanding, and thus misapplying, the Weltover
immediate consequences test, which highlights the test's ambiguity, or
(2) intentionally expanding or glossing over the test in order to
account for the unique nature of IP claims, which are not
well-addressed by the Weltover test. The CYBERsitter court found
that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had violated the plaintiffs
intellectual property rights and that the infringement constituted a

99.
100.
101.
102.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
Id.
Id.
See CYBERsitter, 805 F. Supp. at 977.
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direct effect under the commercial activity exception. 0 3 The two short
paragraphs of the court's opinion devoted to analyzing direct effect,
however, pay only lip service to the immediate consequences test,
leaving uncertain how exactly the court reached its holding. 10 4 The
CYBERsitter court supported its direct effect analysis by citing a
Ninth Circuit opinion, which held that financial loss suffered by a
person in the United States is not sufficient by itself to constitute a
direct effect under the Weltover test. 10 5
However, the opinion did not elaborate on what harm, if not
financial loss, created a sufficient nexus with the United States to
establish a direct effect in the CYBERsitter case. 06 The only inference
to be made, then, is that the CYBERsitter court characterized the
PRC's copyright infringement itself, which occurred in China, as the
relevant harm in the United States. 10 7
This conclusion,
problematically, is not permitted under Weltover's immediate
consequences test. 0 8
In Weltover, the Court did not hold that
Argentina's breach of contract itself was the relevant harm in its
direct effect analysis. 10 9 Rather, it required a consequence of the
breach to occur in the United States thereafter." 0 More specifically,
courts have interpreted Weltover to mean that the determinative

103.
See id. at 977.
104.
See id. at 976-77.
105.
See id. (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 n.2 (9th Cir.
1998)).
106.
See id.
107.
See id. at 977 (noting that because the locus of the injury caused by the PRC's
intentional misappropriation of plaintiffs copyrighted software occurred in the United States at
the plaintiffs principal place of business, the PRC's actions constituted a direct effect in the
United States).
108.
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
109.
See id.
110.
See id. Courts will not find that breach of contract, in and of itself, causes a direct
effect in the United States, even when one of the contracting parties was a US citizen, or the
contract was signed in the United States. See Kettey v. Saudi Ministry of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 3d
40, 51 (D.D.C. 2014) (reasoning that "[allthough Plaintiff was interviewed in the United States
and signed his contract in the United States, the elements of Plaintiffs breach of contract and
quantum meruit claims that would entitle him to relief are his performance and Defendants'
non-payment, both of which occurred in Saudi Arabia"). Instead, courts require the contract to
specify the United States as a place of performance. The court in Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya,
764 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reasoned that "[for purposes of clause three of the FSIA
commercial activity exception, breaching a contract that establishes or necessarily contemplates
the United States as a place of performance causes a direct effect in the United States, while
breaching a contract that does not establish or necessarily contemplate the United States as a
place of performance does not cause a direct effect in the United States." Id. at 40. Furthermore,
a plaintiff's US citizenship cannot serve as the only basis for a finding of direct effect. See Cruise
Connections Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Att'y Gen. of Can., 600 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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inquiry in a breach of contract case is whether or not the contract at
issue specified the United States as a place of performance.1 1 1
For tort claims, such as IP infringement, the analogous inquiry
under the commercial activity exception is whether the locus of the
injury occurred in the United States. 112 Although the CYBERsitter
court addressed this issue, it misapplied the standard by failing to
distinguish between an act and its injurious consequences. Instead,
CYBERsitter conflated the harm of infringement itself with the harm
resulting from the infringement.1 1 3 Strict adherence to Weltover's
reasoning would mean that a direct effect can exist in an IP case only
when the alleged infringement led to an immediate, additional harm
in the United States. A bare showing of infringement is not sufficient,
as this would mean that an act abroad has a simultaneous, and thus
per se, direct effect in the United States. To hold that infringement is
sufficient, as the CYBERsitter court did when it held that an IP
violation in China constituted a locus of injury in the United States,
would eliminate the direct effect's crucial limitation on the United
States' jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against foreign sovereigns.
This, in turn, contravenes the FSIA's underlying presumption of
immunity for foreign sovereigns and their agencies
and
instrumentalities in US courts. Thus, in order to find that a foreign
sovereign's infringement of an IP right held by a US company
constituted a direct effect under the Weltover immediate consequences
test, the CYBERsitter court prioritized the commercial activity
exception over the statute's baseline presumption of immunity.
In addition to misapplying the pertinent locus of the injury
inquiry in its direct effect analysis, the CYBERsitter holding rested on
principles strictly prohibited by Weltover." 4 This also had the effect of
favoring the commercial activity exception over the FSIA's
presumption of immunity.
While purporting to utilize the
post- Weltover "legally significant act" test for determining direct effect,
the CYBERsitter court actually employed a quasi-personal
jurisdictional analysis-an analysis explicitly rejected by the Supreme
1 1 5 Because it
Court in Weltover for being "a bit of a non-sequitur."
offered such limited analysis, it is unclear whether the CYBERsitter
111.
See Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 40.
112.
See Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d. 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1993).
113.
See CYBERsitter,, 805 F. Supp. 2d. at 977.
114.
See id. (invoking principles of personal jurisdiction in support of its direct effect
analysis).
115.
See supra Part V.B; Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 (citing Tex. Trading & Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982)).
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court had a legitimate rationale behind its reasoning that it did not
disclose, or whether it flagrantly ignored the mandate of the Supreme
Court in Weltover.
On its face, however, the CYBERsitter
interpretation of direct effect seems to have disregarded the FSIA's
presumption of immunity as well as Weltover's denunciation of a
personal jurisdiction analysis in order to favor the Act's commercial
activity exception.
2. Strict Adherence to the Immediate Consequences Test Generally
Precludes a Finding of Direct Effect in IP Cases
In contrast to CYBERsitter, the Bell Helicopter court carefully
analyzed the facts of the case before it through the lens of the Act's
presumption of immunity, but was so strict that it left doubt as to
whether an IP claim could ever satisfy the direct effect test. Unlike
the CYBERsitter court, Bell Helicopter rejected the plaintiff-helicopter
manufacturer's theory that "the effect of infringement occurs where
In light of
the possessor of the intellectual property lives. ' 116
Weltover's implicit holding that a personal jurisdiction analysis may
not be used to determine what constitutes a direct effect under the
The court additionally
FSIA, this ruling is not unreasonable.
announced, however, that the Act's direct effect requirement cannot
necessarily be satisfied through reputational harm, financial loss,
interference with a property right, or US citizenship. 11 7 While the
FSIA presumes immunity, the Act specifically carves out exceptions to
this presumption. 1 8 In maintaining such a high bar to a finding of
direct effect, the Bell Helicopter court essentially rendered the
commercial activity exception impotent. When read together with
CYBERsitter, it is evident that courts addressing intellectual property
claims under the FSIA struggle to balance the Act's presumption of
immunity with its exceptions to that presumption.
3. The Weltover Test is Inadequate for Addressing the Uniqueness of
Intellectual Property Infringement Claims
While it is possible to attribute the divergent reasoning of Bell
Helicopter and CYBERsitter to the courts' misunderstanding of the
immediate consequences test and the dual aims of the FSIA, it is more
likely that such inconsistency is the result of the Weltover test's failure
to account for the unique nature of IP rights. The immediate

116.
117.
118.

Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d. at 1183.
See id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
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consequences test, while heavily criticized, may be appropriate for
breach of contract claims, like the one at issue in Weltover itself, and
may suffice for some tort claims as well. But in dealing with the
unique types of harm that result from intellectual property
infringement, the Weltover test proves woefully inadequate.
The first major flaw in the Weltover test, as it pertains to
intellectual property, is that it neglects the most fundamental right
owed to an IP rights-holder-the right to exclude. Under US domestic
law, an intellectual property right allows a right-holder to seek
damages or an injunction merely by showing that his right has been
infringed, without proof of additional injury. 119 The US Patent and
Trademark Office, for example, grants patent holders "the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States" for a specified period of time.' 20 The
essential component of any IP right, then, is that it enables the IP
owner to prevent others from infringing on the right, regardless of
whether the infringing party actually profited financially or harmed
the right holder's reputation as a result of the infringement. The
statutory rights granted to IP holders are thus unique in that they are
intangible.
The intangible rights afforded to IP owners under US domestic
law are not adequately protected by the FSIA's immediate
consequences test, as interpreted by Weltover. While the CYBERsitter
court held that a foreign state's infringement of a US company's IP
right constituted a direct effect in the United States, it did so only by
121
evading the true requirements of the immediate consequences test.
Understood correctly, the Weltover direct effect test requires proof of
injury beyond a basic showing of infringement. 122 This means that a
fundamental component of an IP right is not recognized under the
FSIA's commercial activity exception, since the immediate
consequences test ignores the possibility that infringement itself can
create a direct effect in the United States.
In addition to prohibiting a mere claim of infringement from
constituting a direct effect, FSIA jurisprudence also suggests that
neither financial loss nor reputational harm is sufficient to satisfy the
immediate consequences direct effect test.123 In Weltover, for example,
the plaintiff argued that Argentina's breach of contract negatively

119.
See, e.g., Infringement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("An act that
interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a patent, copyright, or trademark owner.").
120.

35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).

121.
122.
123.

See supra Part V.B.1.
See supra Part V.B.1.
See Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d. at 1183-84.
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affected New York City's status as a world financial leader. 124 The
Court rejected this harm as too attenuated to constitute a direct
effect. 12 5 Analogizing to Weltover, the Bell Helicopter court similarly
rejected plaintiff-manufacturer's contention that reputational harm
could establish a direct effect. 12 6 Likewise, many circuit courts have
refused to find a direct effect where the plaintiff alleged nothing more
than financial loss. 1 27 Applying these tenets to IP cases potentially
leaves plaintiffs without any recourse. Without the ability to satisfy
the immediate consequences test through a showing of infringement,
financial loss, or reputational harm, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
in which a plaintiff could ever recover under the commercial activity
exception in an IP case.
One likely cause of the Weltover test's inadequacy is that it was
designed to deal with tangible harms. Breach of contract cases, for
example, focus on place of performance, and courts confronting
intentional tort claims look to the locus of the injury. 128 But for
intellectual property, where harm is less tangible, rules applicable to
the physical world are cumbersome and clumsy. When a company
misappropriates a protected trademark, precisely where has the harm
occurred? 129 Or in determining whether a copyright violation resulted
in reputational damage, how does a court determine where one's
reputation exists? 130 In the Digital Age, where intangible harms are
more prevalent and physical boundaries are less meaningful, courts
are increasingly forced to grapple with these perplexing issues, but are
ill equipped to do so.
The current status of the law regarding the direct effect
provision essentially excludes all IP claims from the benefits of the
FSIA's commercial activity exception. Given the importance of IP
rights in the Information Age, and the incentives that drove Congress
to enact exceptions to the FSIA's presumption of immunity, it is
essential to revise the immediate consequences test in order to
accommodate IP claims.

124.

Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.

See id.
125.
Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d at 1183-84.
126.
See, e.g., Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d. at 36 ("Mhe fact that an American individual
127.
or firm suffers some financial loss from a foreign tort cannot, standing alone, suffice to trigger
the exception.").
128.
Id.
Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and 'The
129.
Interwebs," 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2015).

130.

See id. at 1134.
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VI. SOLUTION: REINTERPRETING THE FSIA's DIRECT EFFECT
REQUIREMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE NATURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

In light of the ambiguity of the Weltover immediate
consequences test and its ineffectiveness in dealing with intellectual
property claims, the Supreme Court should craft a clearer standard
that better reflects the unique nature of IP rights. This Note suggests
a four-step analysis to replace the Weltover immediate consequences
test in intellectual property cases. The proposed test provides that the
effect of the foreign sovereign's commercial act abroad must be:
(1) more than a bare claim of infringement, (2) felt in the United
This revised
States, (3) actual and direct, and (4) substantial.
standard upholds Weltover's requirements that the relevant harm
must be felt in the United States and that the harm felt must be
actual and direct in order to constitute a direct effect of the foreign
sovereign's extraterritorial act.13 1 However, step (1) of the four-part
test would alter the existing analysis by recognizing that the relevant
consequences will vary depending on the type of claim. Finally, step
(4) would reinstate the substantiality requirement used by a majority
132

of courts pre-Weltover.

A. The Effect Alleged Must Be More than a Bare Claim of
Infringement, But May Include Claims of ReputationalHarm and
FinancialLoss
The most significant departure from the Weltover immediate
consequences test that this Note proposes is an expansion of the types
of effects that may satisfy the direct effect requirement in intellectual
property cases. Under the first factor of the revised immediate
consequences test, courts may consider any consequence of IP
infringement in a direct effect analysis other than the harm of the
infringement itself. Such an expansion will permit courts to account
for the unique nature of IP rights in a direct effect analysis, which will
in turn uphold the aims of the commercial activity exception.
The principal flaw of the Weltover immediate consequences test
is its ambiguity, which leaves courts to analogize to the facts of
Weltover, rather than providing a standard that has a clear
application beyond breach of contract claims. Limiting Weltover to its
facts is problematic in intellectual property cases, because the opinion
effectively prohibits consideration of the only claims an IP owner could
131.

Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.

132.

See id.
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raise in order to prove direct effect-namely, reputational harm and
financial loss. 133 In breach of contract cases, courts have refused to
find a direct effect on the basis of economic loss alone, instead
characterizing this type of harm as "secondary or incidental" unless
the contract contemplated that capital would be directly delivered to
the United States. 134 Financial loss in any other situation would
likely involve an intervening act, such as an expenditure to rectify
harm from the breach, a reduction in sales, or an inability to meet
obligations to customers or investors.
By contrast, in an IP case, reputational harm and financial loss
are not attenuated from an infringement claim. On the contrary, they
are a fundamental component of the bundle of rights held by an IP
owner. 13 5 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that "[t]he
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare ....-136 This implies that the right to reap the reputational
and financial rewards of an innovation is central to the concept of
intellectual property. Thus, if an entity infringes on a patent,
copyright, or trademark, it inherently denies the IP-holder the
exclusive benefit of those rewards. In the context of intellectual
property, the Weltover immediate consequences test is therefore
unfairly punishing because it fails to distinguish between IP
infringement and breach of contract claims in terms of the relevant
consequences that may constitute a direct effect.
The test that this Note proposes allows courts to consider any
effect in the United States that results from IP infringement abroad.
However, this revised test will not depart from Weltover in the sense
that bare claims of IP infringement will not suffice to establish a
direct effect under the FSIA. Even though a plaintiff could recover in
US courts against a non-sovereign upon a showing of infringement,
such a system would be incompatible with the FSIA. Realistically, in
the context of foreign sovereign immunity, Congress could never have
intended IP infringement to cause a per se direct effect of the sort seen

See id. ("Although we are happy to endorse the Second Circuit's recognition of 'New
133.
York's status as a world financial leader,' the effect of Argentina's rescheduling in diminishing
that status (assuming it is not too speculative to be considered an effect at all) is too remote and
attenuated to satisfy the 'direct effect' requirement of the FSIA."); see also Virtual Countries, Inc.
v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d. 230, 239-41 (2d. Cir. 2002) ("If Virtual Countries were
right and any economic harm to it as a corporation was necessarily a direct effect under the
FSIA, the legally significant act test would be meaningless.").
Corzo v. Banco Cent. De Reserva Del Peru, 243 F.3d. 519, 525 (9th Cir. 2001).
134.
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
135.
Id.
136.
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in CYBERsitter. The act of infringement in an IP case should instead
be treated in the same manner as a breach of contract claim, with
some additional consequence required to establish a direct effect.
By requiring an effect in the United States beyond mere
infringement, this test will sufficiently eliminate findings of per se
direct effect in IP cases and will thus uphold the FSIA's presumption
of immunity. However, the test will also reflect the aims of the
commercial activity exception by allowing courts to consider harms
that are unique to IP claims and will thus combat the unnecessarily
prohibitive effect of post-Weltover jurisprudence in the realm of
137
intellectual property.
B. The Effect Must Be Felt in the United States
The revised immediate consequences test allows courts to
consider all effects of IP infringement in the United States in a direct
effect analysis besides the harm of the infringement itself. However,
such an expansion of the direct effect test must be tempered by the
existing FSIA requirement that the harm be felt in the United States.
In the context of the broader consequences of IP infringement given
consideration by this Note's test, such as financial loss or reputational
harm, this would require a showing of harm to the IP holder's
interests in the American market, but would not consider harm to the
IP holder's interests in any foreign market. This creates a necessary
barrier to US jurisdiction over claims that are entirely concerned with
a foreign market and do not affect the plaintiffs US interests. Courts
should be careful to note that while the effect of infringement must be
felt in the United States, that effect must not be the result of
marketing or sales carried on within the American market, as such a
scenario would be properly addressed under the other prongs of the
commercial activity exception.
To illustrate, it would not be enough for a company to allege, as
did the plaintiff in Bell Helicopter, that harm to its foreign or
international market ultimately resulted in financial loss in the
United States, merely because that is the site of the company's
principal place of business. On the other hand, it would qualify as a

137.
In characterizing the type of effect that must be felt in the United States under the
commercial activity exception, it is important to note that the effect need not be an actionable
claim in itself. The immediate consequences test calls for an effect of the foreign sovereign's act
abroad to be felt in the United States, but it does not require that an independent cause of action
occur in the United States. Such a requirement is relegated to the first and second clauses of the
commercial activity exception, which contemplate acts that occur within the territory of the
United States. For example, proof of reputational harm that is significant, but does not rise to
the level of defamation, would be a permissible direct effect under this test.
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direct effect in the United States if an IP owner suffered reputational
harm, financial loss, or another consequence in his share of the US
market. This means that if the plaintiff-IP owner in Bell Helicopter
had clear evidence that international customers had ceased
purchasing helicopters from Bell in the United States because of the
availability of the infringing products in Iran, this would be a
sufficient showing of direct effect under the test proposed here. In
essence, the infringing acts of the foreign state abroad must directly
interfere with the IP owner's sales, reputation, or other interest
domestically; otherwise, the US plaintiff may not recover under the
FSIA.
C. The Effect Felt Must Be Actual and Direct
In order to constrain the broad scope of this test's first prong, it
is necessary to preserve the Weltover Court's requirement that
consequences under the direct effect provision be actual and direct.
This serves to eliminate claims that are too attenuated to establish a
sufficient nexus to the United States, which alleviates Due Process
and personal jurisdiction concerns in addition to upholding the FSIA's
presumption of immunity by appropriately constraining the United
States' jurisdiction to adjudicate.
The requirement of directness is necessitated by the text of the
FSIA itself 138 and indicates that claims made under the direct effect
provision may not involve speculative harms, intervening acts, or
Speculative harms are those that cannot be
self-inflicted loss.
substantiated and instead merely predict future injury. The test
proposed here would align with the court's reasoning in Bell Helicopter
that claims of potential financial loss, reputational harm, and
consumer confusion are speculative, and thus too attenuated to
constitute a direct effect.
Furthermore, an effect under this test will not be considered
direct if it involves an intervening act. So, for example, if an
international consumer transported one of the infringing helicopters
in the Bell Helicopter case to the United States and used it there, the
US IP right holder could not bring suit against Iran under the direct
effect prong of the FSIA's commercial activity exception, since the
transport of the machine would constitute an intervening act.
Finally, a self-inflicted harm to an IP owner will not satisfy the
direct effect provision of the FSIA. For example, if a US company
reacts to a foreign state's infringing activity by increasing its overseas

138.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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advertising or investing in a public relations representative, such
expenses will not be considered domestic effects under this direct
effect test.
D. The Effect Must Be Substantial
In light of its expanded definition of direct effect, the final
jurisdictional protection offered by this revised test is the
reinstatement of the pre-Weltover substantiality requirement. The
requirement of substantiality under this prong is a low bar-it would
merely provide courts with the discretion to eliminate claims that
would offend notions of international comity or that would undermine
the principles behind the FSIA's presumption of immunity. In passing
the FSIA, Congress surely did not contemplate that suits under the
FSIA would turn courts into small claims tribunals. For example,
Congress almost certainly did not anticipate that a local songwriter
would be able to recover under the FSIA for a single CD bootlegged by
the Chinese government.
The restoration of the pre-Weltover direct effect requirement is
warranted because the rationale that the Weltover Court relied on in
eliminating it is now moot. The Weltover Court reasoned that courts
improperly derived the substantiality requirement from an irrelevant
reference in the FSIA's legislative history. Congressional hearings
held prior to the Act's enactment indicate that the direct effect
provision should be interpreted in light of Section 18 of the Second
Restatement of Foreign Relations-a section addressing jurisdiction to
prescribe. 139 The Weltover Court found that the topic of the Section
was not relevant to its inquiry and rejected its language regarding
substantiality. However, even prior to the Weltover opinion, the
Restatement was revised so that the relevant language elucidating the
meaning of direct effect was added to a section concerning jurisdiction
to adjudicate. While Congress relied on the Second Restatement,
rather than the Third Restatement, in drafting the FSIA, it is
reasonable to think that the enacting Congress was not wrong to point
to a requirement of substantiality, in light of the fact that it is
relevant to both jurisdiction to adjudicate and to prescribe. 40 Further,

139.

See Gohkle, supra note 18, at 297-98.

140.

See id.; compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 18 (1965) (requiring conduct that occurs outside a nation's territory to have a
"substantial" and "foreseeable" effect within that territory in order to form the basis for
jurisdiction to prescribe) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 421 (1986) (requiring that an activity "carried on outside the state" have a "substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect within the state" in order for a state to exercise its jurisdiction to
adjudicate).
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if the FSIA had been passed after the publication of the Third
the
Restatement, the Supreme Court likely would not have dismissed
41
language regarding substantiality as "a bit of a non-sequitur."'
The four-step test proposed by this Note primarily serves to
ensure that intellectual property claims are given fair weight under
the FSIA's commercial activity exception. At the same time, this test
seeks to maintain the Act's presumption of immunity by fairly limiting
the scope and nature of permissible claims and by reinstating a
requirement of substantiality.
VII. CONCLUSION
The direct effect provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act has long confused courts and scholars alike-a confusion that was
only deepened by the Supreme Court's announcement of its immediate
consequences direct effect test in Weltover. The Weltover immediate
consequences test has failed to create a workable standard for courts
to utilize in assessing direct effect claims. The failures of the test are
particularly prevalent in the realm of intellectual property, where the
only two courts to address direct effect as it relates to IP claims
reached seemingly incompatible conclusions. In one case, the court
essentially held that an IP infringement abroad created a per se direct
effect domestically. In the other, the court applied the Weltover
immediate consequences test so stringently that it effectively
precluded any consequence of infringement from satisfying the FSIA's
direct effect requirement. Neither court succeeded in balancing the
FSIA's presumption of immunity with its explicit exceptions to
immunity.
To remedy the many failures of the Weltover immediate
consequences test, particularly as it applies to intellectual property,
this Note suggests a revised four-part test that would effectively
account for the unique nature of IP rights, while still maintaining the
presumption of immunity upon which the FSIA is founded. The test
proposes that, in assessing direct effect, a court should: (1) ensure that
the claim before it is more than a bare assertion of infringement;
(2) determine whether a consequence of the claim, beyond mere
infringement, is felt in the United States; (3) ascertain whether the
consequence is actual and direct, with no intervening actors; and
(4) reject claims that are trivial. A principled application of this test
will ensure that courts properly balance the FSIA's presumption of
immunity and its exceptions to that presumption. Additionally, by

141.

See e.g., Gohkle, supra note 18, at 297-98; see Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
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tailoring the revised test's first prong to account for other types of
legal claims, this test could possibly have broad application and may
aid in resolving the ambiguities of the direct effect test beyond the
field of intellectual property as well.
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